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SUBJECT: OSCE: LAVROV AT ASRC ADDS LITTLE ON NEW SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Addressing the opening session of the OSCE
Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) June 23, Russian FM
Lavrov ploughed familiar ground in terms of the rationale and
outline of the Russian proposals to strengthen European
security architecture. He attributed much of the
deterioration of Europe's security over the past decade to
NATO enlargement, which has splintered any chance for a
common commitment to indivisible security across all of the
OSCE area. He argued there were three factors contributing
to impaired security: lack of trust between governments,
risks of internal ruptures, and the inability of the
international community to respond. Lavrov urged
participating States to recommit to non-interference in
internal affairs of other countries, renounce the use of
force to settle conflicts, adhere to international mechanisms
for regulating conflict and provide support for international
organizations dedicated to preventing conflict. He said a
new security architecture would have four major building
blocks: interstate relations, arms control, conflict
management, and new threats.

¶2. (SBU) In response, many delegations raised the protracted
conflicts, citing the Georgia case in particular and urging
Russian agreement to re-establish an OSCE and UN presence in
the disputed territories and respect the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its
internationally recognized borders. The Georgians expressed
concerns about the security situation within Russia, citing
Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, and cited inconsistencies
between Russia's professed respect for territorial integrity
and last summer's war in South Ossetia. In addition to the
prepared statement, the U.S. also responded to Lavrov by

defending NATO enlargement as a bottom-line contributor to
enhanced European security and involving willing states on
all sides. In response, Lavrov defended Russia's actions
leading to the war with Georgia and in trying to secure a
"status-neutral" continuation of the international presence.
End summary.

Lavrov Opens ASRC

¶3. (SBU) At the opening session of the OSCE Annual Security
Review Conference on June 23, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov noted that the first ASRC was held at the request of
the U.S. in the months after 9/11 to address the threat of
terrorism. In 2009, the OSCE was again confronting threats
and problems as profound as terrorism, including shortcomings
in the architecture of Euro-Atlantic security. Although the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact had disappeared, Europe has
yet to establish a common system of security. Some states
continue to pursue their own security at the expense of the
security of others, he argued, in violation of the NATO
Charter and even Kant's categorical imperative to treat
others as one would want to be treated, a principle reflected
in President Obama's recent speech in Cairo and Article IV of
the French Declaration on the Rights of Man from 1789.

¶4. (SBU) Although Russian president Medvedev had already
proposed a new concept for European security, the devil would
be in the details. This proposal would be based on existing
institutions: NATO would not be dismantled and the OSCE would
become a full-fledged, UN Chapter 8 regional organization.

It was too bad, then, that Russia's Western partners persist
with plans for NATO expansion; quoting George Kennan, Lavrov
termed enlargement "the Allies' greatest mistake in the last
50 years." This expansion was destabilizing and had led to
the military gambles of some states on Russia's borders. The
choice was between a common, indivisible security or the mere
illusion of security.

¶5. (SBU) How could the common security be obtained? How
should Russia react to NATO expansion? How can the needs of
individual states be reconciled with the needs of the
Euro-Atlantic area? Lavrov argued that the OSCE reflects a
political commitment; NATO a legal one. A new security
arrangement for the pan-Euopean area should be based on legal
commitments by all Euro-Atlantic states.

Threats to Address

¶6. (SBU) A new security arrangement will need to respond to a
range of threats: traditional interstate tensions resulting
from a lack of trust; internal threats within states
resulting from religious and ethnic clashes; non-state
problems that transcend national borders, including organized
crime, drugs, and trafficking. Within the OSCE's area at
present these threats were addressed by several different
sub-regional groups with overlapping agendas that lacked
focus. Yet the framework to address this range of threats,
which had been developed at Istanbul in the 1999 Platform for
Cooperative Security, has not been fully employed. There has
been no long-term response to the need for a commonly
accepted security architecture. Lavrov argued the CFE Treaty
was an urgent priority when it led to the disarming of Russia
and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, but the adapted treaty
has now languished for ten years after Russia disarmed and
Eastern Europe joined NATO. Another instrument to address
common security concerns, the Vienna Document, was now only
half-functioning, and many of its still effective measures
were not implemented in good faith.

New Architecture's Building Blocks

¶7. (SBU) Lavrov explained the Medvedev proposal for a new European security architecture would contain four major building blocks:

- basic principles of state relations, including sovereignty, territorial integrity, restraint from use of force, and right to choose allies while eschewing the formation of military alliances, rejection of single state guarantors of the international system;

- arms control and confidence-building measures, including non-aggressive defenses and non-stationing of substantial combat forces on foreign territory

- conflict management principles based on a common approach, including the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter, non-use of force, international mediation, protection of civilians, non-interference with peacekeeping forces, non-isolation of conflict zones

- new threats, such as proliferation of WMD, organized crime, and trafficking

¶8. (SBU) Russia had no ulterior motives in making these proposals. There was no need to worry: a common approach would be developed through the same process of dialogue and consensus that worked for Europe and Russia even during the Cold War. The discussions should take place in the NATO-Russian Council, EU-Russia consultations, and even bilaterally: Germany, France, and Finland had already made significant contributions to the dialogue. As few were satisfied with the current situation, Russia expected all pS would work together, without undermining the current institutions, to get beyond the "era of alliances."

¶9. (SBU) Lavrov proposed as a next step to convene a meeting of the heads of leading international organizations, including the OSCE, NATO, the EU, the CIS, and CSTO, on the basis of the Platform for Cooperative Security accepted by the OSCE. The discussion should focus on a comparative review of the organizations' different security strategies and the creation of a reliable architecture to meet the demands of "hard" security, without which "soft" security will never be tenable. The Medvedev proposal gives Europe another chance to "get it right." Failure to engage with the proposal would lead to a reversion to national approaches to security with negative consequences for the OSCE area. Lavrov warned against linking engagement with a new treaty for hard security with resolution of certain soft security concerns: "it would not be wise," he concluded.

Lavrov on Georgia

¶10. (SBU) In response to interventions from Georgia and other delegations, Lavrov said Russia had circulated many documents at the OSCE explaining its position on Georgia; he urged delegations to read them for a full understanding of the Russian position. They contained facts, not allegations. While Russia had always supported the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity for the states of the South Caucasus, it was Georgia's President Saakashvili who launched the attack on South Ossetia after affirming as late as July 2008 that he would refrain from the use of force to resolve this territorial dispute and who told French President Sarkozy that the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia should not be subject to an international discussion.

¶11. (SBU) Lavrov argued Russia supported pragmatic approaches to the problems of the South Caucasus that would include consultations with the authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia could again support an OSCE mission to the region, but it required consent from South Ossetia and

Abkhazia and needed to recognize "realities on the ground."
Lavrov said the UN still maintained a presence in the region,
with representatives of UNICEF and the UNHCR in Abkhazia.
Unlike some of Russia's partners, who were taking a
non-pragmatic, ideological approach to issues in the South
Caucasus and Kosovo, Russia preferred a common path to
solving the problems of both these regions that emphasized
fairness. Lavrov noted that an international police presence
in the South Caucasus was rejected by EU High Representative

Solana, although Russia could still accept this.

U.S. and Others Criticize Russia

¶12. (SBU) The keynote address by Lavrov on a new European
Security Treaty was nearly overshadowed by participating
States' general concern over the marked erosion of the
security atmosphere since the last ASRC in 2008. Beginning
with the Greek CiO's introduction, interventions repeatedly
identified the August 2008 conflict in Georgia as the cause
of a significant degradation in confidence within the OSCE
region. Nearly all registered regret that pS could not reach
consensus over the Greek CiO's compromise plan to extend the
OSCE presence, including military monitors, in Georgia.
Among others, the EU, Georgia, France, and the U.S.
criticized Russia's recognition of Georgia's separatist
regions. In a similar vein, most interventions admonished
Russia for blocking a technical extension of UNOMIG. Nearly
all agreed that the August crisis underscored the need for pS
to reaffirm basic principles and improve the OSCE's conflict
prevention and crisis response mechanisms. The U.S. also
defended NATO enlargement as contributing to the security of
the Euro-Atlantic area and involving willing states on all
sides.

¶13. (SBU) Aside from the August crisis, pS also reiterated
concerns over the state of conventional arms control,
specifically the lack of movement on CFE. Several noted that
pS respect for existing commitments was a necessary precursor
for successful discussions on future commitments and called
on Russia to return to full implementation of its obligations
under CFE. Others mentioned additional measures, such as the
recent high-level meeting of experts in Berlin, as welcome
steps in attempting to break the impasse.

¶14. (SBU) New and emerging threats also were raised in the
opening session. Georgia expressed concern over the security
situation within Russia, citing Chechnya, Dagestan and
Ingushetia as flash points that could impact security
throughout the region. Several pS listed narco-trafficking,
terrorism, nonproliferation, cyber crime, energy and
environmental security, and illegal immigration as among the
emerging threats. Kazakhstan and OSCE Asian Partner
Mongolia noted the importance of stability in Afghanistan and
proposed increased OSCE efforts to build security in the
region.

¶15. (SBU) Despite these concerns, pS welcomed Minister
Lavrov's presence as a clear sign that Russia is serious
about improving security in the region. Several
interventions noted the timeliness of a discussion of
European security given the current state of affairs. Many
identified the OSCE as the most appropriate venue for future
discussions on European security. While Lavrov referred
repeatedly to the Russian proposal on "hard security," many
pS reinforced the view that any discussion should be
multidimensional.

Looking Forward to Corfu

¶16. (SBU) Finally, a number of pS welcomed the CiO Corfu

initiative as a logical next step to the assessment that pS
would attempt over the course of the review conference.
Belarus characterized the informal Ministerial as a logical
link between the ASRC and the next Ministerial in Athens and
expressed hope that pS would come to Athens with specific
proposals. The CiO and Switzerland hoped that Corfu could
result in a decision on how to proceed with dialogue.
Scott